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Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Richard R. Nelson
Public vs. proprietary science:
a fruitful tension ?

What should be public and what
should be private in scientific research ?

The competitive sprint of public and
private laboratories to complete the
sequence of the human genome has
brought this question to the fore. The
same question frames the developing
struggle over terms of access to human
embryonic stem cell lines and the con
flict between Microsoft and the open
source movement over how best to pro
mote software development.
We expect such conflicts to become
Rebecca S. Eisenberg is the Robert and Barbara
Luciano Professor of Law at the University of

Michigan Law School. She has been an active
partidpant in public-policy debates regarding
intellectual property in biom?dical research and is

a member of the Panel on Science, Technology

and Law of the National Academies. Professor
Eisenberg is also a member of the advisory com
mittee to the director of the National Institutes of

more widespread as the role of for-profit
research expands in a broader range of
scientific fields. Will science progress
more swiftly and fruitfully if its findings
are in the public domain, or if they may
be captured as intellectual property?

What kinds of research should be fund
ed publicly and what kinds left for pri

vate financing? Is competition between
public and private science stimulating
and constructive, or is it wasteful and

counterproductive ?
Our aim in this essay is to bring these
issues into clearer view. They have been
kept in the analytic shadows until
recently by the presumption that science
and technology are largely distinct
enterprises. In fact, the problems arise in

areas where science and technology

overlap.

We thus begin our discussion by
reviewing the conventional distinction
between science and technology. We

Business and Law, at Columbia University, focus

then consider different perspectives on
the appropriate public and private
spheres in fields where science and tech
nology are intertwined, first in general,
and then in the context of the Human

es his research on long-term economic change,

Genome Project. We conclude with a

including technological advances and the progress

brief analysis of policy options.

Health.

Richard R. Nelson, the George Blumenthal
Professor of International and Public Affairs,

of economic institutions. His recent publications

include uThe Sources of Industrial Leadership"

(with David C. Mowery, 1999).

It is often assumed that science and
technology are - or ought to be - inde
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pendent enterprises. In a classic series of
essays, collected in his 1973 book The
Nelson on Sociology of Science, Robert Merton
intellectual
described science as a public enterprise
property
generating public knowledge. This has
become the standard view, accepted by
many working scientists.
According to this theory, the goal of
scientific research is to advance funda
Eisenberg &

Richard R.

mental knowledge about the world. This
effort need not be directly useful, much
less profitable, at least in the near term,
although sponsors and practitioners of
science generally expect that advances in
scientific understanding will foster later
useful advances in applied technology.

The principal venues for science are uni
versities and government laboratories,
and the principal reward for success is

recognition and acclaim from the scien
tific community. Open disclosure of
research results, through timely publica
tion and other mechanisms permitting
free access, is the norm. Since research
ers do not earn financial returns from
this work, they rely on philanthropic or

public funding.
Most social theorists, including
Merton, have drawn a sharp contrast
between basic science and applied tech
nology. While basic science is a public
enterprise pursuing fundamental knowl
edge, applied technology is a private
enterprise pursuing proprietary solu
tions to practical problems. The goal of
the individuals and firms doing such
applied research is to solve practical
problems in the hope of earning profits.
Such research draws freely on the pool of
public scientific knowledge, but does not
contribute to that pool. Intellectual
property rights protect the profits of

those who invest in successful technolo

gy research, preserving incentives to

provide additional funding.
There is considerable truth in this con
ventional account and the distinction

between science and technology on
which it rests. Basic science and applied
technology often differ in important
ways and flourish under different insti

tutional regimes. Horace Freeland Jud
son's fine history of molecular biology,
The Eighth Day of Creation, illustrates the
power of a research regime in which all
scientists can draw freely upon the prior
work of others, each pursuing their par
ticular interests and bets regarding the

most promising lines of inquiry, check
ing, correcting, and building upon each
other's results. At the same time, the his
tory of technological progress in such

fields as pharmaceuticals shows the
power of profit incentives to promote
the development of products that meet

human needs.
What the conventional account leaves
out, however, is the often complex ways

in which basic science and applied tech
nology frequently overlap. Such cases of
overlap raise difficult questions about
where, and how, to draw lines between
the public and private spheres. More
over, in cases where science and technol
ogy do overlap, public and private inter
ests may conflict - which only makes
more pressing the question of where,
and how, to distinguish between what
ought to be public and what ought to be

private.

From the start of modern science,

many scientists have been interested in
practical problems, and the challenge of
solving those problems has driven their

search for fundamental knowledge. Uni
versities long have dedicated a consider
able portion of their research efforts to

understanding and solving practical
problems, particularly in the United
States, where, until World War II, agri

culture occupied a large share of aca
demic research. In the postwar era, med
ical schools have accounted for a large
and growing share of research at u. S.
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universities, currently amounting to
roughly half of the total. Much of this
work is motivated by the practical goal
of improving human health.

More generally, much academic sci
ence lies in what the late Donald Stokes

focused scientific research is often essen
tial in order to advance these technolo
gies. Some private firms perform basic
research, and many of their researchers
publish scientific papers, although for
profit firms are less inclined than univer
sities to place their findings in the public
domain without restrictions.
In fields where scientific advances

called "Pasteur's Quadrant."1 Standard
taxonomies place the pursuit of funda
mental knowledge and the solution of
practical problems at opposite ends of a have conspicuous commercial potential
one-dimensional spectrum from "basic" (such as pharmaceutical research), the
pursuit of profit and the pursuit of
to "applied" research; Stokes's taxono
my recognizes that the work of many
knowledge often converge, creating sub
stantial overlap in research pursued in
scientists combines both objectives
academic and industrial settings. Re
simultaneously. Like Niels Bohr, Louis
search results are at once part of a grow
Pasteur sought fundamental under
ing corpus of scientific knowledge for
standing, and like Thomas Edison, he
use in further research and an important
sought solutions to practical problems.
For scientists conducting research with step toward a promising commercial
in "Pasteur's Quadrant," the objective is product. Within this zone of overlap,
to achieve the fundamental understand Mertonian public science and market
driven proprietary research coexist, set
ing necessary to solve practical prob

lems.

ting the stage for conflict over what

This hybrid motivation characterizes
most research in the biom?dical sciences
as well as in material science, computer
science, and theoretical work in engi
neering. These fields are not exception
al : they are in the mainstream of con
temporary academic research, posing a
serious challenge to a taxonomy that
draws a sharp distinction between basic

should be public and what should be pri
vate. The challenge for public policy is to
devise arrangements that preserve the
great advantages of an open system for
basic science while still preserving profit
incentives for the creation of valuable

new products.

science and applied technology. In re

In our view, a common way of thinking
about how to draw the line between

cent years private industry has been a
growing source of funds for academic
research in these areas, and universities

public and private science is seriously
misleading. It is often said that public
science ought to focus only on research

have been increasingly inclined to patent
their discoveries.
The other side of the coin is that cor

porate research and development (R&D)
often involves the pursuit of fundamen

tal knowledge. Many technologies
depend on scientific knowledge, and
i Donald E. Stokes, Pasteur's Quadrant: Basic
Science and Technological Innovation (Washing
ton, D.C. : Brookings, 1997).

that private firms will not conduct. If
certain areas of research appear to have
high social value yet promise relatively
low returns, then public financing may
be necessary to correct for the failure of
markets to get the job done. Private
sponsors might not expect to capture
enough value to justify R&D costs if
anticipated research results are far
removed from practical applications, if
they are unlikely to be patentable, or,
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more generally, if profits are highly
Eisenberg &
Richard R. uncertain. On the other hand, if the
Nelson on research offers a reasonable prospect of
intellectual
yielding practical benefits, if intellectual
property
property law permits the sponsor to
appropriate a sufficient share of the
value of those benefits, and if private
firms are therefore willing to undertake
the research, so much the better. In this

case, it is commonly argued, public
funds are not needed and should be

has been a central concern of econo
mists, we think another inefficient
aspect of patents is especially important
in the context of scientific research :

patents on essential materials and pro
cesses may require researchers to seek
licenses before they proceed, which can
impose significant transaction costs. In
biom?dical research today, exchanges of
proprietary research materials, tech
niques, and data are increasingly gov

spent for other purposes (or left in the

erned by material transfer agreements,

pockets of taxpayers).
This analysis assumes that the only

patent license agreements, and database
access agreements.
At a minimum these agreements need
to be reviewed and approved before

argument for public support of science is
that important research would not occur
without it. Although this is an excellent
reason for public support of research, it
is not the only reason. Even if expected

research proceeds ; often they must be
renegotiated, leading to further delays

and sometimes to bargaining breakdown

practical benefits make patentable out

with the potential for future litigation.2

comes likely and motivate private firms
to pay for the research, public funding
might still be justified in order to in

Having the relevant knowledge and ma

crease the open domain of commonly
owned knowledge upon which scientists
may draw freely in future research.

From an economic standpoint, patents
are not an unmixed blessing. Patent
rights motivate private firms to invest in
research, but they also introduce signifi
cant inefficiencies that may inhibit
future research. Patents permit innova
tors to restrict access to, and thus raise

prices for, their inventions. Although
sometimes necessary to allow firms to
recover R&D costs and thus profit from
innovation, such pricing is inefficient,

because it excludes users who would be

willing to pay enough to cover marginal
production costs but not the additional

patent premium. The resulting losses
could be considerable if the excluded
users are not merely private consumers,
but publicly funded researchers per
forming a socially valuable activity.
While the effect of patents on prices

terials freely available in the public do

main minimizes transaction costs by
relieving users of the need to identify
and bargain with intellectual property

owners.

A third problem patents present for
research activity is that they may give
patent holders broad control over future
research paths, allowing them to block
research by rivals. Patents on fundamen
tal discoveries that open up new re
search areas are typically broader than

patents on incremental technological
advances in established fields, because
the principal constraint on the scope of
2 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, "Bargaining Over the
Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools : Is This
Market Failing or Emerging?" in Expanding the
Boundaries of Intellectual Property : Innovation
Policy for the Knowledge Society, ?d. Rochelle

Cooper Dreyfuss, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman,
and Harry First (New York : Oxford University
Press, 2001), 209-249 ; Michael A. Heller and
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, "Can Patents Deter
Innovation ? The Anticommons in Biom?dical
Research," Science 280 (1998) : 698-701.

92 D dalus Spring 2002

This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Tue, 10 Jan 2017 18:27:54 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Public vs.

sub-Saharan Africa or Medicare patients
proprietary
in the United States).
science
The problem that concerns us arises
when the domain of public science
becomes entangled with the domain of
proprietary product development. This
zone of overlap has been growing steadi
ly since the late 1970s. An important fac
tor has been the development of molec
Public science has flourished by permit ular biology, a science squarely in Pas
ting scientists to challenge and build
teur's Quadrant, as a field of both public
upon the work of rivals. Intellectual
and private research. Partly because of a
series of laws often referred to collec
property rights to fundamental discover
ies threaten to limit the number of play
tively as "the Bayh-Dole Act," by which
businesses and universities can claim
ers in the system at an early stage, there

patent claims is the prior state of knowl
edge in the relevant field.3 Broad claims
on early discoveries that are fundamen
tal to emerging fields of knowledge are
particularly worrisome in light of the
great value, demonstrated time and
again in the history of science and tech
nology, of having many independent
minds at work trying to advance a field.

by diminishing its power.
On the other hand, private enterprise
has been an extraordinarily powerful
engine for the generation of new prod
ucts and processes, and in some fields
(notably pharmaceuticals) strong patent
protection has been a vital part of the
system. Businesses, driven by the hope
of profit and the fear of competition,
have a far better feel than government
agencies for the kinds of new products
the market wants and can respond more

property rights to technology created
under publicly funded programs, univer
sities have become active participants in
the patent system.4 A large share of uni
versity patents are in molecular biology.

Many of these patents cover basic dis

coveries :5 as the Patent and Trademark

Office (PTO) and courts have allowed
such "upstream" patents, a significant
private industry has grown up around

pre-product development research in
molecular biology, seeking to profit by

quickly to emerging demand and tech
nological opportunities.

patenting and licensing discoveries to

For the most part, the inefficiencies
associated with patents do not generate
strong pressures to substitute public
R&D for proprietary R&D, even for prod
ucts such as pharmaceuticals that meet
important public needs. Although we
might lament the high cost of patented
drugs, the advantages of promoting pri

commercial products. The result has
been a considerable blurring of the
public-private divide, with universities
and other one-time champions of open
science claiming their own intellectual
property, while private firms extend pro

vate investment in new product develop
ment generally outweigh the inefficien
cies of patents. Rather than displacing
private R&D, the government can subsi
dize access to patented inventions for
needy users (such as AIDS patients in
3 See 35 US Code ?? 102,103 ; Robert P. Merges
and Richard R. Nelson, "On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope," Columbia Law
Review 90 (1990): 839-916.

other firms that use them to develop

prietary research further upstream,

sometimes in collaboration with aca

4 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, "Public Research and
Private Development : Patents and Technology
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research,"
Virginia Law Review 82 (1996): 1663-1727.
5 David C. Mowery, Richard R. Nelson, Bhaven
N. Sampat, and Arvids A. Ziedonis, "The
growth of patenting and licensing by U.S. uni
versities : an assessment of the effects of the

Bayh-Dole Act of 1980," Research Policy 1 (30)

(2001): 99-?19.
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demie scientists and sometimes in com

Richard R. petition with them.
Nelson on
Although the convergence of public
intellectual
and private resources for biom?dical
property
research has accelerated progress, we
believe that current policy and practice
may have gone too far in promoting
patenting of fundamental research dis

coveries.

Patents on inventions with clear prac
tical applications may well facilitate
product development, but patents on
discoveries that may spur future basic

research impose serious costs on the sci

oped proprietary tools that would great
ly accelerate the Human Genome Pro
ject, including automated DNA-sequenc
ing machines and the polymerase chain
reaction. The mass-production character
of sequencing 3 billion base pairs of
DNA, and the "top-down" organization
such a task seemed to entail, set it apart
from the investigator-initiated proposals
for creative, small-scale, academic inves
tigations that had been typical of NIH
funded research. Yet talk of private ini

tiatives to sequence the genome repeat
edly provoked concerns about ensuring

entific enterprise and are much harder to
justify. The Bayh-Dole Act ignores this

access to the data for use in future re

distinction, although it is becoming

funding.
Private investors have repeatedly fund

increasingly important to federal agen
cies that support fundamental research
and to private firms that draw on emerg
ing knowledge to develop new products.
The Human Genome Project provides a
useful focus for exploring these issues.

iublic and private efforts to complete
the DNA sequence of the human genome
vividly illustrate the interests at stake in

mediating the public-private divide in
Pasteur's Quadrant. Although the
Human Genome Project began in the
late 1980s as a government funded "Big
Science" project, from the outset it

promised both new fundamental knowl
edge and practical payoffs with the
potential for commercial profit.6
By the late 1980s private firms already

had a substantial presence in genetics
and molecular biology and had devel
6 For a definitive account of the origins of the
Human Genome Project, see Robert Cook
Deegan, The Gene Wars : Science, Politics, and the

Human Genome (New York : W. W. Norton,
1994). For an early analysis of the project from
leading scientists, see National Research Coun
cil, Mapping and Sequencing the Human Genome

(Washington, D.C. : National Academy Press,

1988).

search, renewing enthusiasm for public

ed targeted projects within the broad

scope of the Human Genome Project
that seemed likely to yield commercially
significant results, sometimes taking
advantage of the reluctance of the public

project to focus on "cream-skimming"
projects that could jeopardize later sup
port for the more costly job of complet
ing a definitive reference sequence of the
human genome.7 In the early 1990s pri
vate firms focused on sequencing the
estimated 3 percent of the genome that
cells use to make proteins, using an

approach called "cDNA sequencing."
One such firm, Human Genome Sci
ences, was founded to exploit a research
strategy pioneered by Dr. J. Craig Venter,
then at the NIH, of using automated

DNA-sequencing machines to obtain
partial sequences (called expressed
sequence tags, or ESTs) for genes ex
pressed in human tissue samples.
7 Two recent histories offer excellent
overviews of these events. See Kevin Davies,
Cracking the Genome : Inside the Race to Unlock

Human DNA (New York : Free Press, 2001) ; and
Gary Zweiger, Transducing the Genome : Informa
tion, Anarchy, and Revolution in the Biom?dical

Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001).
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While academic researchers debated
the wisdom of pursuing this strategy
given available technology, resources,
and priorities, private investors seized
the opportunity to bypass skeptical gov
ernment sponsors and peer reviewers
and created a nonprofit research institu
tion to support Venter's work, reserving
commercial rights for Human Genome
Sciences. This and similar efforts created

valuable private databases of informa
tion, but academic institutions soon

Public vs.
proprietary
quencing" strategy that Venter hadscience
used

pursue a "whole-genome shotgun se

successfully to sequence microbial
genomes.8 Like cDNA sequencing,
whole-genome shotgun sequencing was
a strategy that the academic community
had so far passed up for the human
genome,9 leaving an opportunity on the
table that private investors seized. But
this was a more surprising plan from a
business perspective. By this time cDNA
sequencing had revealed many of the

commercially promising genes (and gen
erated patent applications on them).
ers.
Although more genes were expected to
In the mid-1990s, when new technolo
surface in the course of completing the

complained about the restrictive terms
of access offered by the database own

gy made it feasible to detect and identify
genome, most of the remaining se
single base-pair differences in the DNA
quence was presumed to be "junk DNA"
of greater interest to scientists than to
of different individuals (single nucleo
investors. Nonetheless, investors were
tide polymorphisms, or SNPs), private
firms invested in SNP identification.sufficiently optimistic to drive the mar
Like gene fragments, SNPs promised
ket to
capitalization of Celera up to over
be a valuable information resource for
two billion dollars by the end of 1999.

both academic research and productThe sponsors of the Human Genome
development. Recent experience with
Project responded by accelerating and
proprietary databases of gene fragments
increasing their financial commitments
led some scientists to worry that propri
to complete the public version of the
etary SNP collections might not besequence
ac
more rapidly. At first, they crit
cessible to them on reasonable terms,
icized Celera's proposed sequencing

prompting the public Human Genome
strategy, charging that it would leave
Project to compete with the private significant
sec
gaps in coverage that would
tor by allocating some of its own funds
be difficult and costly to finish. Soon,
to SNP identification.
however, the public project changed its
In May of 1998, just as the public own course in order to provide an un
Human Genome Project had completed
finished "rough draft" of the genome as
its initial mapping goals and was enter
quickly as possible. The two groups
ing the phase of large-scale sequencing
claimed substantial completion of their
of the genome, a new private company
respective efforts in simultaneous publi
came on the scene with the goal of com
pleting the sequence several years8 ahead
J. Craig Venter et al., "Shotgun Sequencing of
the Human Genome," Science 280 (1998) :
of the public project - under the scien
1540-1542.
tific direction of Craig Venter, who by
then had left the NIH. The new compa
9 See James L. Weber and Eugene W. Myers,
ny, to be called "Celera" after the Latin
"Human Whole-Genome Shotgun Sequencing,"

Genome Research 7 (5) (1997) : 401 ; Philip Green,
word for speed, would use a new genera
tion of DNA-sequencing machines"Against
and a Whole-Genome Shotgun," Genome

Research 7 (5) (1997) : 410.
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cations in Science and Nature in February
Eisenberg & of 2001.10
Nelson on
The brief history of public and private
Richard R.

intellectual

property

involvement in sequencing the human
genome shows conflicting views from
the two estates regarding the importance
of making knowledge freely available in
the public domain. Free access to the
genome has been a mantra within the

public genome community, repeatedly
invoked as a motivation for accelerated
disclosure policies and justification for
accelerated funding to complete the
sequence before private competitors
capture it as a proprietary resource.
Although it is a common ploy to invoke
public-spirited justifications in support
of requests for public funding, it is hard
er to dismiss the many concurring views
emanating from the private sector,
sometimes backed by private funds to
generate information in the public

domain.

From the beginning, scientists worried

that it would be difficult to enforce

norms of public disclosure and access
for sequences generated by different sci
entists in different institutions. The
usual trigger for disclosure in academic
research - publication of results - would
not serve as a timely enforcer for release
of accumulating data that might not be
ripe for journal publication until long
after it was generated. The presence of

commercial interests and the looming
prospect of intellectual property claims

heightened these concerns.
Controversy over the public or private
character of the genome erupted more
urgently in 1991 when the NIH filed
?o J. Craig Venter et al., "The Sequence of the
Human Genome," Science 291 (16 February
2001) : 1304-1351 ; International Human
Genome Sequencing Consortium, "Initial
sequencing and analysis of the human
genome," Nature 409 (15 February 2001) :

860-921.

patent applications on the first few hun

dred gene fragments (or ESTs) se
quenced by Craig Venter. This was a
provocative act on many levels. The
patent filings, although consistent with

U.S. laws encouraging government agen
cies to patent discoveries and license
them for commercial development,11
were in tension with rhetorical justifi
cations for public funding of the Human
Genome Project to ensure public access
to the sequence. Foreign governments
viewed the patent filings by a U.S. gov
ernment agency as inconsistent with
efforts to promote the Human Genome
Project as an international collaboration
to reveal the universal heritage of hu
manity. Patent claims for the discovery
of mere fragments of genes struck many
scientists as a premature reservation of
commercial rewards for incomplete
research results that were not yet mean
ingful and required further research to
identify useful applications. Industry
trade groups feared that patents on gene
fragments would inhibit research to
understand the role of genes in disease
and would add to the costs of drug

development.
Databases of ESTs quickly proved to

be a valuable information resource for

both private and academic scientists. But
the two groups faced different con
straints on their ability to gain access to

the proprietary databases. As pharma
ceutical firms signed database access
agreements with price tags ranging from
under $10 million to over $100 million,

academic institutions balked at signing
agreements that would commit them in

advance to share future intellectual

il See Bernadine Healy, "Special Report on
Gene Patenting," New England Journal of Medi
cine 327 (1992) : 664 ; and Reid G. Adler,

"Genome Research : Fulfilling the Public's
Expectations for Knowledge and Commercial
ization," Science 257 (1992) : 908-912.

g6 D dalus Spring 2002

This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Tue, 10 Jan 2017 18:27:54 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

property rights with the database own
ers. Finally, in a dramatic inversion of
traditional public and private roles, the

Merck pharmaceutical firm agreed to
sponsor a competing cDNA sequencing
effort at Washington University, with

newly identified sequences to be
promptly disclosed in a public data
base.12 Paradoxically, a controversy that
began with patent filings from a govern
ment agency ultimately gave way to an

extraordinary private-sector endorse
ment of the value of the public domain.

Another variation on traditional pub
lic and private roles occurred a few years
later when ten pharmaceutical firms

joined the Wellcome Trust Foundation

cumbersome provision, the NIH took a

different approach. In its request for
science
grant applications, the NIH stressed the
importance of making SNP information

readily available to the research commu
nity, advised grant applicants that their
plans for sharing results would be con
sidered by NIH staff as one of the criteria
for an award, and warned that the NIH

would monitor grantee patenting activi
ty.15 This approach was arguably in ten
sion with the spirit, if not the letter, of
the Bayh-Dole Act. Ultimately, the pri
vate sector again came to the rescue of
the public domain with the formation of

the SNP Consortium, which unabash

tification had begun as proprietary re
search in the private sector, provoking

edly proclaims a strategy of identifying
and disclosing SNPs in order to prevent
other firms from patenting them. Once
again, in the Bayh-Dole era it appeared
to be simpler for private firms to endow
the public domain than it was for the
federal government to do the same.

the public Human Genome Project to

The importance of public access to the

to form the SNP Consortium, a private
venture to identify common points of
variation in the human genome for dis

closure in the public domain. SNP iden

call for a consortium of federal agencies
to fund SNP discovery and to place the

human genome figured prominently in
the case for continued funding of the

results in unrestricted public databas

public Human Genome Project follow

es. x3 The candid justification for public
funding was to prevent private appropri
ation of SNPs as intellectual property.
But this strategy was constrained by the

Bayh-Dole Act, which allows grant re
cipients to retain title to inventions
unless the funding agreement specifies

otherwise based upon an appealable
finding of "exceptional circumstances."14
Loath to invoke this rarely used and
12 Eliot Marshall, "A Showdown Over Gene
Fragments," Science 266 (1994): 208-210.
13 Francis S. Collins, Mark S. Guyer, and
Aravinda Chakravarti, "Variations on a Theme :

Cataloging Human DNA Sequence Variation,"
Science 278 (1997): 1580-1581.

ing Celera's entry into the field. Celera's

founders acknowledged the importance
of free access by promising initially to

release Celera's raw sequence data to the
public on a quarterly basis,16 although
the timing and details of this commit
ment wavered thereafter. The public
sponsors of the Human Genome Project
stressed the importance of prompt and
unrestricted access to the sequence,
15 National Institutes of Health RFA HG-98
001, "Methods for Discovering and Scoring
Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms" (9 January
1998) <http ://www.nhgri.nih.gov :8o/
Grant_info/Funding/RFA/rfa-hg-98-ooi.html>
(visited 1 August 2001).
16 Venter et al., "The Sequence of the Human

14 35 US Code ? 202(a), (b)(i), (b)(4), 203(2).

Public vs.
proprietary

Genome."
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Nelson on

intellectual

property

which they ensured by requiring
grantees to deposit new sequence data in
the publicly accessible Genbank data
base within twenty-four hours.17 Cel

era's business model, which involves

selling access to proprietary data and
bioinformatics capabilities that sub
scribers would not pay for if they could
get them for free, constrains its disclo

sure policies. Although Celera's promised
quarterly data releases never occurred,

Celera agreed to provide limited access
to its data free of charge on its own web
site as a condition of publication in
Science, subject to restrictions that pre
served the market for its proprietary

products.
Celera has had more success than prior
owners of proprietary genomics data
bases in marketing database access
agreements to academic and govern
ment subscribers. It has made agree
ments on undisclosed financial terms
with a number of major research univer
sities and academic hospitals, as well as
with the National Cancer Institute. Evi
dently Celera has something to sell over
and above the information and tools that
are freely available from Genbank, and
evidently Celera's terms of access are not
prohibitive for publicly funded investi

gators. Celera's database should be at
least as good as the public database,
given that Celera itself has free access to

Genbank. At the same time, the exis

tence of a public database with much of
the same information presumably limits

what subscribers are willing to pay (and
what Celera is able to demand) for
access to the proprietary database. The
existence of Genbank may thus con
17 Testimony of Francis S. Collins, Director,
National Human Genome Research Institute, at

a Hearing on the Human Genome Project
before the Energy and Environment Subcom
mittee of the House Science Committee, 17 June

1998 (Lexis).

strain Celera's market power in ways
that make the proprietary data more
affordable for all researchers.

The story of the Human Genome
Project in the public and private spheres
is not yet over. Although most of the

genome has now been sequenced, the
hard work of figuring out what it all
means has barely begun. So far, the most
significant intellectual property con
straint on use of the sequence in re
search has come from the terms of data

base access agreements rather than from
patents. But many patent applications
are pending on genes, gene fragments,

SNPs, and even DNA sequences stored in
computer-readable medium, and many
of these patent applications were filed
before the same sequences were deposit
ed in Genbank. Although the patenting
of DNA molecules that encode therapeu
tic proteins is a well-established prac
tice, the patentability of DNA sequences

with more speculative utility is much
contested and has not yet been ad
dressed by the courts. Depending on
how these issues of patentability are
resolved, scientists might soon discover
that they need patent licenses to make
use of sequences they thought were in
the public domain.
Although it may never be known
whether public or private research
efforts ultimately contribute more to
future biom?dical research and product
development, it is probably safe to say
that neither of these efforts would have

achieved as much as quickly without the
other. Apart from providing additional

and complementary capabilities and
enabling technologies, the private sector
has repeatedly provided funding for pro
ductive research strategies that public

sponsors passed over.
In a Big Science project that allocates
government research funds according to
a coordinated plan, the existence of a
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ly separate estates, one might preserve
vigorous private-sector research enter
proprietary
an open domain for science by limiting
science
prise limits the risk that good ideas will
go unfunded, at least when they offer a what may be patented to technology
reasonable chance of yielding practical while relying on public funding to pro
mote science. This is arguably the intu
payoffs. The peer-review process for
ition behind traditional legal exclusions
allocating government research funds
from patent protection for natural prod
does much to ensure the political inde
pendence and high quality of public sci ucts and laws of nature and for inven
ence, but it may tend to favor conven
tions with no demonstrated practical
tional approaches and prevailing beliefs utility.18 But steady pressure to provide
over bold new ideas. Competition
patent protection for discoveries in
among researchers pursuing different
Pasteur's quadrant has eroded these
restrictions. Perhaps the erosion has
strategies with similar goals speeds sci
ence along and improves the likelihood gone too far.
of success.
Long before the advent of commercial
genomics, the courts had narrowly con
At the same time, freely available data
from the Human Genome Project has
strued the exclusion dealing with prod
ucts of nature to uphold patents on
undoubtedly accelerated research in
purified preparations of products isolat
both the public and private sectors. In
addition to providing a free resource for ed from nature.19 Although intuitively
users of genomic information, it has
appealing, excluding the stuff of nature
from patent protection has no clear basis
improved the completeness of propri
in the patent statute, and judicial opin
etary databases (by providing data that
ions recognizing the exclusion have
owners may incorporate in proprietary
failed to articulate a consistent rationale
products and by setting a benchmark
for it. It has thus been vulnerable to the
that they must exceed in order to have
same systematic erosion of judicial lim
something to sell) and improved terms
of access to proprietary databases (by
its on patentability that has recently
made way for patents on computer algo
providing a free alternative that limits
rithms and business methods.20
how much owners may demand).

Although proprietary databases might
be more profitable if there were no
Genbank, the free database plainly has
neither destroyed the market for propri
etary databases nor undermined incen
tives to create them.
JLN umerous public-policy choices deter

mine the balance between public and
private research in Pasteur's Quadrant.
These choices include legal rules about
what may be patented and how patents
are used and managed, as well as deci
sions about what kinds of research the

government will fund and what strings
are attached to public funding.
If science and technology were entire

The utility requirement has a clear
statutory basis,21 and academic scien
tists have urged the PTO to use this
i8 On exclusions from patent protection for
natural products, see Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 US 127 (1948). On patents on
inventions with no demonstrated practical
application, see Brenner v. Manson, 383 US 519

(1966).

19 E.g., Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical
Corp., 253 F2d 156 (4th Cir 1958) (upholding
patentability of purified vitamin B12).

20 See State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature
Financial Group, 149 F3d 1368 (Fed. Cir 1998),
cert, denied, 515 US 1093 (1999) ; AT&T Corp. v.
Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F3d 1352 (1999).

21 35 US Code ?? 101,112.
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requirement to reject patent claims on
DNA sequences until their biological
function is understood. But an appellate
court sharply rebuked the PTO just a few
years ago for applying a strict utility
standard to biotechnology products ; the
court reminded the PTO that "usefulness
in patent law, and in particular in the
context of pharmaceutical inventions,

necessarily includes the expectation of
further research and development."22 At
least as presently understood, the utility

requirement does not seem to preclude
patenting fundamental discoveries with
practical implications that remain un

proven.

These time-honored limitations on the

reach of the patent system have arguably

been degraded without explicit attention
from Congress and may now need to be
fortified to preserve the freedom of sci
entists to study the natural world. A nec
essary first step would be a careful analy
sis of the purposes these rules serve in

mediating the public-private divide in
science and technology. On one hand,
withholding patent protection could
prove costly if it undermines private

R&D incentives. On the other hand, the

benefits to future research and product

development of preserving the scope
and vigor of public science might out
weigh these costs.
Another option would be to carve out

ries be treated similarly? Should patents
on research tools that have no significant

market outside the research community
be subject to a research exemption that
effectively eviscerates their commercial

value? The Human Genome Project
offers numerous examples of patented
research tools that were marketed to

both academic and commercial re
searchers to the great benefit of the
research community. Such tools might

never have been developed without
patents, making the ultimate impact on
research of such a change in the law
difficult to predict. On the other hand,
many important research tools have
come out of government-funded univer
sity research, and their invention
arguably did not require patent protec

tion.

Yet another option, which would not
require changing the patent rights of pri
vate firms, would be to provide public
funding to generate research results in
the public domain, even if the private
sector is already performing similar
research on a proprietary basis.
This was ultimately the strategy pur
sued by the public sponsors of the

Human Genome Project, although they
had to maneuver around the Bayh-Dole
Act to do it. The extraordinary commit
ment in the scientific community to

making the human genome sequence
freely available offered the sponsors pro
tective cover for a policy that grantees

an exemption from infringement liabili
ty for researchers. Ideally, this approach
would retain effective protection against

might otherwise have challenged as con

competition in the commercial market
place while minimizing the impact of

trary to the law. But if the Bayh-Dole Act
impedes the ability of public research

patents on the research community.
But it is difficult to define the proper
scope of such an exemption when there
is no clear line between the commercial

sponsors to enrich the public domain of
science, perhaps it needs revision.
The flourishing of a robust private
genomics industry alongside the public
Human Genome Project calls into ques
tion the strong presumption under the
Bayh-Dole Act that the results of govern
ment-sponsored research must be pat

and research spheres. Should researchers
in academic and commercial laborato
22 In re Brana, 51 F3d 1560 (Fed. Cir 1995).
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ented in order to preserve incentives for
follow-on research in the private sector.
That the pharmaceutical industry has

repeatedly conspired with public spon
sors to get genomic information into the

public domain at its own expense is
compelling evidence that proprietary
control of information can impose sig
nificant costs on subsequent research
and thereby obstruct, rather than pro

mote, product development.
But public science is more than a pre
lude to product development. At its best,
it is a social commitment to disinterest

experts operating under the critical
scrutiny of their peers. It is a shared

archive of an expanding knowledge
base, a training ground for future re
searchers, and the germ from which

future advances in human understand

ing will grow. Its social value does not
depend on the ultimate profitability of
the advances it spawns. If we need
profit-seeking firms to tell us that the

public domain has value, something
important is missing from our under
standing of science.

ed investigation of the world by credible
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